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Abstract  
 
    This paper analyses the inter–firm R&D network formed in the pharmaceutical 
biotechnology industry during the 1990s from different perspectives: theoretical network 
formation, firm’s structural positions and its collaborations at the entire network level, and the 
determinants for firm’s centrality–based partnering capability. The results indicate that 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry has experienced a significant evolutional change in size 
and structure during 1991–1998. By considering individual structural positions, the descriptive 
statistics show that in the 1990s, established pharmaceutical companies developed into 
dominant star players with multiple partnerships while holding central roles in the R&D 
network. In the network analysis that emphasized aggregate network level, the degree–based 
and betweenness–based network centralization were not high implying that the distribution of 
overall positional advantages in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry is, to a large degree, 
not unequal and even though most firms in this sector are linked to the R&D network, some of 
them are more active than others. The current analysis also shows that firm’s efficiency, firm’s 
dependency on its complementary resources and firm’s experiences at managing partnerships 
are important determinants for firm’s centrality–based partnering capability, which has 
important managerial implications for understanding firm’s strategic partnering behaviour.  
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1   Introduction 
 
    High technology industries with their rapidly developing innovation and knowledge 
base serve as an important source for the national economy. Their development 
demands firms to possess knowledge and skills in multiple technological fields in order 
to meet market conditions. In such a dynamic and competitive industrial environment, 
no single firm has the ability to keep pace with the growing scientific and technological 
progresses without external partners (Cantner and Rake, 2011). Particularly in the 
high–tech sector of pharmaceutical biotechnology, as widely acknowledged in the 
literature, the creation of a tight inter–firm network of research and development 
(R&D) collaboration has become an unavoidable strategy for innovative companies (see 
Chiaroni et al., 2008; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006; Salman and Salves, 2005). As a 
result, the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry has witnessed a sharply increasing 
frequency of inter–firm partnerships between large established pharmaceutical firms 
and a range of biotechnology companies in recent decades (see Hagedoorn and 
Roijakkers, 2002; Powell et al., 2005; Rothaermel, 2000). Especially during the 1990s, 
the inter–firm partnerships between these two high technology sectors have successfully 
created a track for high technology companies to achieve progress in knowledge and 
innovation (Roijakkers, 2003). As more and more firms from the pharmaceutical 
biotechnology sector realized the importance of innovation, the cooperation between 
high–tech firms turned out to be dense and tight, and their communication network 
became “a small world” to the extent that vast numbers of firms with different 
national origins were all connected to each other, which consequently globalized the 
world market in the high technology sector. Using the information from Recombinant 
Capital database1 in 1995, we could draw the global connection of the pharmaceutical 
biotechnology industry with the network visualization software Pajek (Nooy et al., 
2005), in which each red orb indicates one company and the black lines with two 
arrows represents the cooperation between them (Figure 1). This R&D network 
between firms seems to be a prime illustration for the renowned “small world 
phenomenon” (Milgram, 1967), which refers to the “six degrees of separation” principle 
                                                 
1 Recombinant Capital is a San Francisco Bay Area–based consulting firm specializing in biotechnology 
alliances and reputed to have built some of the largest and most detailed biotech business intelligence 
databases in the world. Its clients include biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, plus several 
universities active in the biotechnology area. 
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that the network distance between any two individuals in the world is, on average, six. 
Obviously, a cooperation network between firms is not distinct from a social network 
between people. Globalization makes the world narrow and small, and the distance is 
no longer an obstacle for the connections. Furthermore, integrating into such a research 
network enables high–tech firms to optimally share the resources that they possess. As 
a result, they would have opportunities to access the resources available in the whole 
world, and exchange technological and innovative information with greater facilities.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: “Small world” of the pharmaceutical biotechnology sector in 1995; source: 
Recombinant Capital. 
 
    However, cooperating firms do not share equal opportunities and advantages within 
the same network. Goyal and Joshi (2003), from a view of theoretical network 
formation, indicated that collaborations used by firms to generate strategically stable 
networks are often asymmetric, with some firms having many collaboration links and 
other firms being poorly linked. This asymmetry can be observed on the core–periphery 
structure of the network, in which central firms that are situated in favoured structural 
positions have more opportunities to perform better than the firms located on the 
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network periphery (Hojman and Szeidl, 2004). A firm’s capability to place itself 
centrally could be quantified by its centrality, which is one of the earliest concepts to 
describe an actor’s strategic position in a network. There have been a number of 
authors who investigated the topic relating to firm’s centrality on a wide range of 
aspects. Tsai (2001) suggested that a firm’s innovative capability is significantly 
increased by its centrality in the intra–organizational network, which provides the 
opportunities for knowledge transfer and information exchange. Walter et al. (2007) 
proposed that a firm’s centrality in the inter–firm network positively affects its ability 
to acquire knowledge from its collaboration partners. Thus, in order to obtain more 
chances for acquiring knowledge, a firm has to actively pursue a positional advantage 
by aligning itself with a central player of the inter–firm network. Santos (2003) applied 
longitudinal data in a sample of 225 biotech companies and found that the size of firms 
is positively correlated with their previous network centrality, and due to the 
advantages of knowledge spillovers, the development of a central position in the 
network positively influences firms’ future growth. Powell et al. (1996) empirically 
demonstrated that a central position in inter–firm learning networks for biotechnology 
start–ups is related to their rapid subsequent growth. By using pharmaceutical 
biotechnology industry data, Hagedoorn et al. (2006) pointed out that firms with larger 
centrality–based capability are more likely to engage in future partnering activities. 
While the above–mentioned aspects have been rather extensively treated in the 
literature, relatively scarce attention has been paid to the question of what essentially 
determines a firm’s centrality–based network capability. In the current paper, we will 
empirically test the possible determinative factors of a firm’s centrality–based 
partnering capability in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry by using the 
econometrics approaches of two–stage least squares (2SLS) and the optimal generalized 
method of moments (GMM).  
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive and empirical analysis of 
inter–firm R&D networks in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry. In this context, 
this paper exploits the insights gained from inter–firm cooperation of this high 
technology sector under different aspects: theoretical network formation, firm’s 
structural positions and its collaborations at the aggregate network level, and the 
determinants for firm’s centrality–based partnering capability in the R&D network. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides 
the theory of network formation and its applications to firm’s cooperation, especially 
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the cooperation between firms in the pharmaceutical biotechnology sector. It also 
describes the evolutional structural change in the pharmaceutical biotechnology 
network during the time period 1991–1998. Section 3 discusses conceptions and relevant 
descriptive statistics for the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry with regard to 
actor–level centrality and network–level centralization, and then identifies the most 
important players in the inter–firm R&D network of this high–tech sector during the 
period 1991–1998. Section 4 comprises an empirical analysis to identify the 
determinative factors of a firm’s centrality–based partnering capability which is 
followed by a discussion with special attention to the managerial implications of our 
findings. The final section presents the major conclusions drawn from this paper.  
 
 
 
2   The Economics of Networks 
 
Networks play an important role as intermediary between economics and social 
society. The growth of modern industries and economics would be diminished to a large 
degree without the communication and information in a social network. Earlier studies 
indicated that social networks are essential for economics activities. These studies cast 
some lights on the networks in the labour markets in the context of networks as means 
of obtaining jobs (see Myers and Shultz, 1951; Rees and Shultz, 1970). This interest 
was further developed by the studies of Boorman (1975) and Montgomery (1991), 
which were crucial early bridges between the sociology literature and the economics 
literature (Jackson, 2007). One of the important views expressed in these studies is the 
choice–based perspective that underlines economic network formation, which can be 
captured as: individuals form or maintain relationships in their mutual interests, and 
avoid or remove themselves from relationships that are not beneficial. In a R&D 
collaboration network, firms behave analogously to individuals in the way that they 
form a link when the cooperation is reciprocal and delete a link that cannot bring any 
benefits to them. The economics behind such a network of firms is that the cooperation 
provides firms a way to integrate their separate resources in order to achieve the 
optimal efficiencies that a single firm itself cannot reach (Gottinger and Umali, 2008). 
This feature is especially important for the high–tech industry, in which the formation 
of R&D networks is regarded as an adaptive response to the rapidly growing knowledge 
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within the sector. In the following, some theoretical issues in the network formation 
will be discussed and their applications to the cooperation between firms, particularly 
the firms in the high–tech sector of pharmaceutical biotechnology will be addressed.  
    One of the fundamental concepts underlining network formation is pairwise stability, 
which was defined by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). According to these authors, a 
network is considered as pairwise stable if no pair of players could benefit from linking, 
while no single player could gain by severing one of his links. This concept of pairwise 
stability, which involves a mutual consent to form a relationship, shows the response of 
players to the cost and benefits that they expect from network relationships. Issues 
related to group formation have also been a central concern of network theory. In the 
literature, group formation is modelled in terms of a coalition structure, in which 
coalitional membership partitions the set of players into mutually exclusive groups. 
Initial work on coalition formation was carried out within traditional cooperative game 
theory, which describes a variety of productive enterprises where the cooperation 
among players is beneficial (Jackson, 2007). By adopting this setting into the 
experiments, Myerson (1977) pointed out that cooperation leads to higher utility than 
separate efforts and predicted how the value should be split among members of the 
society, which is now referred to as the Myerson Value. Following up on this work, 
there have been a number of studies on cooperative games, for instance, Aumann and 
Myerson (1988) proposed a game of link formation in a strategic context where players 
anticipate the effect that communication has on cooperative opportunities and 
ultimately on the value that they will obtain. Apart from the studies on cooperative 
group formations, there have also been developments of non–cooperative theory of 
coalition formation, such as the open membership game of Yi and Shin (1995), the 
coalition unanimity game of Bloch (1995 and 1996), and the equilibrium binding 
agreements of Ray and Vohra (1997).  
    Under the aspect of network efficiency, a fundamental theoretical model which 
presents the value of relationship should be brought to our attention. It was proposed 
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) under the name “connection model” and has been 
largely adopted and developed in later studies. In the setting of this model, a link 
indicates social relationships which offer benefits and also involve some costs. Players 
benefit from both, direct relationships and indirect relationships, but benefits decrease 
with the distance between any pair of players to the extent that a “friend of a friend” 
generates a lower benefit than a friend. The results from the model imply that if the 
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costs of a relationship are low enough, the efficient network is a complete network (i.e., 
where everyone directly links to everyone). However, if the costs are very high relative 
to the benefits, the empty network (i.e., without any links) will be the only efficient 
network, and for the intermediate level of costs, the star network with the feature of 
pairwise stability is the efficient network structure. This “connection model” also 
illustrates another fundamental point of theoretical network formation, namely that 
there could be a tension between stability and efficiency. Specifically, in this model, a 
link between two players can reduce distances for all players in a network, but the 
player who is directly involved in this link would only consider whether or not his 
payoff will increase, without thinking about whether this link will increase the payoffs 
of others. This situation renders the pairwise stable networks inefficient. Some authors 
use the “connection model” to also identify the relation between efficiency and stability 
in a network. For instance, Bala and Goyal (2000) analyzed the “connection model” 
under the assumption that players form links unilaterally. In their two–way flow 
setting, the conflict between stability and efficiency again exists, represented by the 
example of telephone calls: one player makes the phone call and incurs the cost of 
calling, but both players benefit from the information exchange during the telephone 
conversation. Another example relating to the tension between efficiency and stability 
is the “co–author model” (see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). The story accompanies the 
collaboration on a research project: when one researcher decides to join in a project 
with another researcher, he dilutes the time he spends on each of his current projects, 
which negatively affect his productivity on each of his projects. This decline in 
productivity influences the researcher but also affects each of his collaboration partners. 
However, he would only account for the negative effect on his own utility but ignore 
the effects on his collaboration partners. As a result, the inefficiency of a stable 
network becomes evident. To resolve the conflict between efficiency and stability, the 
players within a network could bargain over payments by themselves to attain the 
efficiency, or the government could take actions of reallocating value through transfers, 
such as taxes and subsidies (Goyal, 2007).  
    As discussed above, the theoretical modelling and analysis reveal the impact of 
social science on economic behaviour. In particular, it raises the question of how social 
structure influences the economic decisions and interactions of an individual. It is 
necessary to make a forecast of how the individual’s behaviour changes in response to 
network changes in a way that the individual would have a general idea of what will 
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occur when the network changes and adopt a corresponding behaviour to the present 
situation. The initial concept underlying network formation is that of costs and benefits, 
which not only reflects the perspective of an individual, i.e., that the individual forms 
relationships based on reciprocity, but also reflects the perspective of the society as a 
whole. It is not surprising that maximizing individual incentive may not reach the 
maximum of the societal welfare, which results in a tension between efficiency and 
stability within a network. This tension could be minimized by different channels but 
its intensity is difficult to be observed and measured, which may also depend on the 
specific feature of theoretical settings. These theoretical models not only provide the 
prospects about how the decisions of players contribute to the network formation, but 
also highlight their role in explaining phenomena of collaborations between firms. 
Kawamata and Tamada (2004) analyzed firm’s incentive to form pairwise links and 
pointed out that cost–sharing is a powerful incentive as it allows firms to pool their 
resources and avoid wasteful duplications. Similar results were also found in earlier 
studies (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; Kamien and Zang, 
1993; Katz, 1986; Suzumura, 1992). In these cost–reducing alliance references, as 
summarized by Bloch (2004), either the collaboration covers all the companies in the 
industry (as in Kamien et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992), or the industry can be 
partitioned into symmetric leagues (as in Kamien and Zang, 1993). Besides, Goyal and 
Moraga–González (2003) presented a survey of research on the formation of networks 
between firms and found that markets shape the firm’s incentives to form pairwise 
links, while links between firms affect their competitive position and thereby shape the 
function of the market. Goyal and Moraga–González’s (2001) analysis highlighted the 
relationship between market competition, firm’s incentive to invest in R&D, and the 
architecture of collaboration networks. Their results showed that the complete network 
is pairwise stable and industry–profit maximizing, and firms may engage in excessive 
collaborative activities in a model with endogenous choice of effort. Goyal and Joshi 
(2003) also studied the firm’s incentives to form collaboration links and found these 
incentives to be intimately related to the nature of market competition. Their results 
suggested that under quantity competition there is no conflict between efficiency and 
stability, whereas there is a conflict under price competition. Song and Vannetelbosch 
(2007) showed that the likelihood of a conflict between efficiency and stability is 
considerably reduced to cases of very small or quite large spillovers. They suggested 
that governments should be allowed to subsidize R&D whenever spillovers are not very 
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small. More recently, Zikos et al. (2010) proposed that state–owned enterprises may be 
used as policy instruments in tackling the potential conflict between individual and 
social incentives for R&D collaboration.  
    In the high technology industries, R&D collaborations between firms have become 
especially crucial, since the knowledge base and innovation process in these industries 
are diversified and rapidly developing. This high–tech environment requires that firms 
upgrade their knowledge and skills constantly to meet market conditions and 
customers’ expectations. Particularly in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, 
firms can no longer exclusively rely on their internal skills and knowledge to maintain 
their innovativeness. It is also necessary for them to access external sources of 
knowledge through collaborations and create innovative products to harvest the 
knowledge (Zahra and Bogner, 2000). Under these circumstances, in order to gain 
competitive advantages, pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology firms established 
inter–firm R&D collaborative network in a variety of partnership forms. This R&D 
network formation in fact grounds on the choice–based perspective that is emphasised 
in the network theories. From this view, the cooperation between pharmaceutical 
companies and biotechnology firms is based on their reciprocal interests to the extent 
of their complementarities. By connecting to biotechnology firms, large pharmaceutical 
companies could successfully undergo the challenges of technological innovation during 
so called “biotechnology evolution” and keep their dominant position in the high–tech 
industry (Chiaroni et al., 2008), while building up the cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies provided biotechnology firms with important sources to sustain their 
innovative capabilities. This R&D network cooperation offers pharmaceutical 
biotechnology firms various opportunities to increase their efficiency of R&D efforts, 
reduce their cost and risk investing in the launching R&D projects, and create options 
for knowledge and innovation development. Thus, the R&D cooperation is a key factor 
in explaining the industrial growth of this high technology sector (Gottinger and Umali, 
2008).  
    However, the inter–firm R&D cooperation may potentially create negative 
externalities since a partner could simply attain the knowledge and patents through 
free–riding, which results in an essential conflict between private incentive and social 
incentive that we also observed in the network theoretical models. Yet from the 
prospects given by a variety of studies, different authors have different opinions about 
whether R&D cooperation could lead to such a conflict. Anbarci et al. (2002) pointed 
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out that if the degree of complementarity in a certain industry–pair is high enough, 
despite the typical free–riding problem, R&D group formation can secure high 
technological improvement, profits and social welfare; but if complementarity is 
extremely low, research cooperation may lead to lower profits and social welfare. Röller 
et al. (1998) suggested that R&D cooperation in complementary industries would seem 
to have positive welfare implications, while Katz et al. (1990) proposed that the private 
incentives for R&D investment are diminished relative to the social incentive. Although 
the puzzle still exists in the effects of research cooperation, the cooperative R&D efforts 
are generally encouraged by governmental policies, such as permissive antitrust 
treatment of R&D joint ventures and by cross–licensing agreements or similar 
arrangements among firms (Katz, 1986). Nevertheless, a cooperative R&D network 
serves as a mechanism that produces the information efficiency and consequent social 
benefit. It plays an important role in generating technology advances and expanding 
the stock of technological capabilities. The importance of R&D cooperation can indeed 
be observed through the growth of partnering activity in the high technology sector 
over the years (see Hagedoorn, 1995; Gulati, 1995). In the following, we will exhibit 
and analyze the evolutional cooperation trend in the pharmaceutical biotechnology 
industry during the period 1991–19982. The data source that has been used for Figure 2 
and Figure 3 is the Recombinant Capital database.  
 
                                                 
2 This time period was chosen since it covers the years in which inter–firm partnering activities in 
pharmaceutical biotechnology has risen rapidly (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998; Powell et al., 1996; 
Senker and Sharp, 1997). 
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Figure 2: The growth of firms and R&D partnerships in the pharmaceutical 
biotechnology network, 1991–1998; source: Recombinant Capital. 
 
    As shown in Figure 2, the historical data on inter–firm R&D partnering in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry reveal an overall growth pattern in the time 
period 1991–1998: the number of firms which participate in the R&D network 
dramatically increases from 109 in 1991 to 466 in 1998. As a result, the number of their 
partnerships increases as well, reaching a peak of 640 in 1997 and then declining to 584 
in 1998. The important industrial and technological changes in this time period have 
led to the growing interdisciplinary nature of scientific and technological developments, 
increasing costs of R&D projects and higher risks surrounding R&D (Hagedoorn, 1993 
and 1996), which were a major force driving pharmaceutical companies and 
biotechnology firms into the cooperative research network. As a result, the network size 
and partnering activity in this high–tech sector largely increased overall (Figure 2).  
    Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the evolutional structural changes of 
the inter–firm R&D network in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry during the 
time period 1991–1998. Red orbs represent the pharmaceutical biotechnology firm 
within the R&D network and solid black lines with two arrows represent partnerships 
between two companies. The graph shows that the network gradually developed from 
isolated pairs of cooperating companies with a few clusters of multi–collaborator 
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networks to a large complex network with numerous interrelated companies. During 
the early 1990s, large pharmaceutical companies established absorptive capacity for 
assimilating new biotechnology knowledge and built up joint R&D agreements with a 
variety of biotechnology firms. As a result, by 1993, nearly 196 firms were involved in 
this research network representing 159 partnerships (Figure 2). There were still a 
number of one–on–one ties and some isolated research clusters in the early 1990s 
(Figure 3). For the mid–1990s, Figure 3 shows a denser, more connected R&D network 
in which around 300 firms (Figure 2) were engaged in a multitude of joint R&D 
agreements. This results from common research efforts and many newly established 
joint R&D agreements between pharmaceutical companies and biotechnological firms 
during these years. Although the majority of companies were connected to most other 
firms through many partnerships, there were still a few isolated companies cooperating 
amongst themselves, not linking up to any of the other network participants. However, 
in the late 1990s, a very large, extremely dense R&D network had developed involving 
466 companies (by 1998) that were nearly all connected to each other by numerous 
direct and indirect ties (Figure 2 and 3). Due to intensity of inter–firm cooperation in 
this high–tech sector, it would have been very unusual for a firm not to cooperate with 
others. Also, under the high–tech environment with dynamic and innovative knowledge 
base, a firm cooperating in a R&D network is less likely to retreat its participation 
from the cooperation (Powell et al., 1996). Thus, inter–firm cooperation, particularly 
the intensive R&D collaboration, is likely to remain an important feature of the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology sector (Powell, 1998; Senker and Sharp, 1997).  
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Figure 3: Inter–firm R&D 3D networks amongst cooperating companies in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology during the period 1991–1998; source: Recombinant Capital. 
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3   Actor–level Centrality and Network–level     
    Centralization: A Descriptive Analysis 
 
    In the last section, we have revealed that the pharmaceutical biotechnology R&D 
network experienced an evolutionary change in its size and structure during the time 
period 1991–1998. In such a complex network environment, not only network structure, 
but also a firm’s network position plays a crucial role in accessing relevant resources 
and information. In order to provide a quantitative analysis of a firm’s structural 
position in a network, we have employed Social Network Analysis (SNA), which serves 
as the methodical analysis of social networks and complements the traditional 
mathematical techniques. One of the primary applications in the SNA is the 
identification of the “most important” players in a social network. The players who are 
most important are usually located in central positions within the network, which can 
be quantified by various centrality measures (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The three 
most widely used centrality indicators are degree, closeness and betweenness, 
representing different degrees to which a player is capable to extract value from his 
network. These centrality measures of the player can be aggregated over all actors 
within the network to obtain the measures of network–level centralization, indicating 
how centralized the set of players is as a whole. In this section, following Wasserman 
and Faust (1994), we will discuss the conceptions of actor–level centrality and 
network–level centralization, and their applications to and implications for the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry. In accordance with Section 2, the data source 
that will be implemented in this section is Recombinant Capital database and the 
chosen time period is 1991–1998. The software package for computing various network–
related measures is Ucinet 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002). Based on the actor–level centrality, 
the most important players in pharmaceutical biotechnology are defined in the time 
period 1991–1998. With the network visualization function included in Ucinet 6 
(Borgatti et al., 2002), a graph was drawn displaying the firm’s network position and 
interactions in the pharmaceutical biotechnology network (Figure 4).  
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3.1   Degree 
 
    The most intuitive measure of actor–level centrality is degree, which is based on the 
idea that actors are central in a communication network if information can easily reach 
them. An actor with a high degree centrality possesses more contacts to obtain 
information and resources, and thus is located at a more central position than others. 
In contrast, an actor with low degrees, who appears to be less visible in the information 
flows, is peripheral in the network. Even if such an actor decides to leave the network 
or is isolated from the relational process, it would hardly have any impacts on the 
present connections. According to Wasserman and Faust (1994), a degree–centrality 
measure ( )
D i
C n  for an individual actor should be the degree of the node ( )
i
d n , which is 
simply the number of an actor’s direct neighbours. For comparing this measure across 
different sizes of networks, we normalize ( )
D i
C n  by dividing the maximum possible 
value of degrees 1g − , assuming the network size is g . Thus, the normalized actor–
level degree centrality ′ ( )
D i
C n  can be written as 
 
′ =
−
( )
( )
1
i
D i
d n
C n
g
.                                         (1) 
This measure equals 1 at a maximum and attains the value of 0 at a minimum. In a 
directed network, we must distinguish between the number of arcs received by an actor 
(indegree) and the number of arcs sent (outdegree) (Knoke and Burt, 1983). However, 
this would not be the case in the inter–firm R&D network, since the cooperation 
between firms, especially in the high–tech sector, heavily depends on mutual exchanges 
of technological innovation and knowledge. As a result, a network comprising 
cooperating companies is undirected and each firm is simply characterized by its degree. 
The higher the degree of a firm, the larger and quicker information will reach this firm, 
and the more central is this firm.  
    In accordance with Wasserman and Faust (1994), the actor–level degree centrality 
measure can be aggregated across all actors to obtain degree–based network 
centralization. This aggregated index, which indicates the level of the entire set of 
actors, can be defined as 
*
1
2
( ) ( )
3 2
g
D D i
i
D
C n C n
C
g g
=
 
− 
=
− +
∑
,                                 (2) 
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where ( )
D i
C n  in the numerator denotes the g  actor degree indices, *( )
D
C n  denotes the 
largest observed value, and the denominator3 of 2 3 2g g− +  is actually the maximum 
sum of the differences in actor degree centrality. This maximum difference sum occurs 
only for the star network, since the star network is the most centralized network and 
has the maximum degree variation. Hence, the degree centralization in the entire 
network can be interpreted as the variation in the actor’s degree in the observed 
network divided by the degree variation of a star network of the same size (Nooy et al., 
2005). It is also a measure of the dispersion of the actor’s degree indices, since it 
compares each actor index to the maximum attained value (Wasserman and Faust 
1994). This index varies from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating that all actor degrees are equal, 
and 1 indicating that one actor is connected to all other 1g −  actors and all other 
actors interact only with this single central actor.   
    Table 1 provides the normalized degree–based network descriptive statistics in 
pharmaceutical biotechnology over the period of the study. As it shows, the mean of 
normalized actor–level degree centrality decreases steadily during the time period 1991–
1998. This is because the network size, which serves as part of the denominator in the 
normalized degree index, increased dramatically over time (Figure 2). As for single 
company’s normalized degree centrality, we can see from Table 4 that Schering Plough, 
Affymetrix, Pfizer and SmithKline Beecham are each characterized by the highest 
normalized actor degree, which contributes to the judgement that they are regarded as 
the most central players in time period 1991–1998. Other firms which share the 
information with these four companies seem to distribute the information to others 
(Figure 4), possibly because they recognize their central positions, and consider it 
worthwhile to influence other firms in the network. In terms of degree–based network 
centralization in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, the observed value is 
rather low (Table 1). This value declines from 4.43% in 1991 to 2.17% in 1993 before 
reaching a peak of 4.63% in 1997, and then sharply decreases to 2.91% in 1998. Due to 
this low amount of concentration in the whole network during the time period 1991–
1998, the power of individual firms does not vary much. This shows that the overall 
positional advantages based on degrees tend to be relatively equally distributed in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology network.   
                                                 
3 If the network is a star, the maximum value of *( )
D
C n is 1g −  for an actor and ( ) 1
D i
C n = , and thus 
the maximum sum of differences for 1g −  comparisons is 2( 1) 1 ( 1) ( 2)( 1) 3 2g g g g g g − − − = − − = − + 
.  
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3.2   Closeness  
 
    The actor–level closeness centrality, which is based on the graphical distance in a 
network, measures how close an actor is to all the other actors within the network 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Unlike degree centrality, which only accounts for the 
connections to immediate neighbours, closeness centrality takes both, direct 
connections and indirect connections, into consideration. An actor with high closeness 
centrality scores can reach all the network members in a minimum number of steps and 
interact with them efficiently without going through many intermediaries, and 
consequently has more opportunities for information exchange and resource 
transactions. This centrality index is measured as a function of geodesic distances but 
inversely correlated to the distance: when geodesic distance increases, the closeness 
centrality scores decrease. Let ( , )
i j
d n n  denote the geodesic distance (shortest path) 
between the actors i  and j , the closeness centrality of an actor, ( ),
C i
C n  can then be 
expressed as the inverse of the sum of geodesic distances from actor i  to all other 
actors in the network, 
−
=
 
 
 
∑
1
1
( , )
g
i j
j
d n n . For comparisons of indices across different sizes 
of network, we normalize this closeness index through multiplying the inverse of the 
distance by the maximum possible distance 1g − , which can thus be defined as 
 
−
=
 
′ = −  
 
∑
1
1
( ) ( 1) ( , )
g
C i i j
j
C n g d n n   where j i≠ .                     (3) 
 
The normalized closeness index ranges between 0 and 1, reaching 1 when the actor is 
maximally close to all other actors. However, if a network is not strongly connected, 
the closeness centrality cannot be calculated due to the infinite distance between 
disconnected actors. This is the case in the pharmaceutical biotechnology R&D 
network, so instead of using closeness index above, normalized actor’s closeness 
centrality can be calculated with standardized reach closeness, which is an index of 
reach distance from each actor to all others adjusted to the network size. A smaller 
reach distance yields a higher closeness centrality score.  
    The network–level of closeness centralization is analogous to the degree 
centralization in that we compare the amount of variation in the closeness centrality 
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scores of the actors with the variation in closeness centrality in a star–network of the 
same size. The general network closeness index is based on the normalized actor–level 
closeness centrality and can be expressed as 
 
=
 ′ ′− 
=
− + −
∑ *
1
2
( ) ( )
( 3 2) (2 3)
g
C C i
i
C
C n C n
C
g g g
,                                 (4) 
 
where ′ *( )
C
C n is the largest normalized actor closeness in the set of actors and the 
denominator 4  of 2( 3 2) (2 3)g g g− + − is the maximum difference sum of the actor 
closeness centrality. The closeness centralization ranges from 0 to 1, with the index 
attaining its minimum of 0 when the lengths of geodesic distances are all equal. 
Unfortunately, the closeness–based network centralization in the pharmaceutical 
biotechnology industry cannot be computed since the star network does not necessarily 
have the highest variation in closeness centrality scores if the network is not strongly 
connected. However, descriptive statistics, as provided in Table 2, also disclose the 
closeness–based information at the level of the whole network.   
    It can be seen from Table 2 that the average normalized centrality of reach 
closeness remains constant during the period 1991 to 1993 and from 1994 on it raises 
steadily, reaching a peak value of 0.18 in 1997 and then declining to 0.15 in 1998. The 
gap between the minimum and maximum value of normalized reach closeness centrality 
is very small. This low variation results in the overall small value of standard 
deviations. 
    In terms of the specific actor’s centrality, we could take a look at Table 4, which 
shows that Schering Plough, Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Bayer and SmithKline Beecham 
have high centrality scores on reach closeness in the time period 1991–1998. Those 
firms with the highest closeness scores are able to reach the information in the network 
more easily and quickly since they are closer to all other firms. But if one of them 
leaves the network, this will strongly impact the overall network structure. If Schering 
                                                 
4 The maximum possible closeness occurs when an actor is at a distance of 1 from all other actors, and 
all other actors are at a distance of 1 from the center and at a distance of 2 from each other. Therefore, 
the closeness sum for each is ( 1) 1 2( 2) ( 1) (2 3)g g g g − + − = − −  and yields a difference of 
1 ( 1) (2 3) ( 2) (2 3).g g g g− − − = − − Thus, for 1g − comparisons, the maximum possible difference is 
2( 1) 2 (2 3) ( 3 2) (2 3)g g g g g g− − − = − + − .  
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Plough, Incyte Pharmaceuticals, Bayer and SmithKline Beecham (Figure 4), for 
instance, quits from the R&D network, the network structure and the pattern of the 
knowledge flow in pharmaceutical biotechnology will dramatically change. 
 
 
3.3   Betweenness 
 
Degree and closeness centrality that have been applied earlier are mainly based on 
the reachability of an actor within a network. Another factor that could be considered 
for centrality is betweenness, which regards an actor as more central when he is more 
important as an intermediary between pairs of other actors in the communication 
network. More specifically, a central actor occupying a “between” position could 
control resource flow and coordinate information between network members that 
otherwise do not have a connection. The more network members depend on this actor 
to make connections with others, the more important the role of this actor is in the 
information flow. Thus, an actor with a high betweenness centrality score is strongly 
needed in a network as a link in the chains of contacts that helps distribute 
information. In accordance with Wasserman and Faust (1994), let 
jk
g denote the 
number of geodesics paths between actors j  and k , ( )
jk i
g n denote the number of 
geodesics between actors j  and k  that pass through actor i , the actor–level 
betweenness centrality ( )
B i
C n can thus be expressed as 
<
∑
( )
jk i
j k jk
g n
g
, which is the sum of 
probability of an actor i  standing along any geodesics5 that all pairs of actors in the 
network have selected. As with the other centrality standardizations, we normalize the 
betweenness centrality scores by dividing ( )
B i
C n  by the maximum possible 
betweenness6 2( 3 2) 2g g− +  so that it can be easily compared to the other actor 
                                                 
5 According to Wasserman and Faust (1994), 1
jk
g  is the probability that a message passes along any one 
of the actor j  and k , and thus ( )
jk i jk
g n g  is the probability that actor i  falls on a randomly selected 
geodesic linking actor j  and k , under the assumption that geodesics are equally likely to be chosen for 
the path.  
6 Since maximum betweenness centrality can be obtained only when there is an actor 
i
n  that falls on all 
geodesics of length greater than one,  the upper limit of ( )
B i
C n  is simply to compute the number of 
paths connecting pairs of actors where 
i
n  falls on the path between them. We know if all actors are 
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indices as well as across different sizes of networks. This normalized actor–level 
betweenness for 
i
n  is then given by 
 
<
′ =
− +
∑
2
( )
( )
( 3 2) 2
jk i
j k jk
B i
g n
g
C n
g g
    for i j k≠ ≠ .                       (5) 
 
Compared to the closeness index, the betweenness centrality has the advantage that it 
can be computed even if the network is not strongly connected. This index takes a 
minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 1 when the actor i  falls on all geodesics.  
    Analogous to degree and closeness measure, the actor–level betweenness can be 
aggregated across actors to obtain the overall network centralization index, which 
allows us to compare different networks with respect to the heterogeneity of the actor’s 
betweenness. According to Wasserman and Faust (1994), betweenness centralization is 
simply the variation in the betweenness centrality scores of actors divided by the 
maximum variation in betweenness centrality scores possible in a network of the same 
size: 
 
*
1
3 2
( ) ( )
( 4 5 2) 2
g
B B i
i
B
C n C n
C
g g g
=
 
− 
=
− + −
∑
,                               (6) 
                                
where *( )
B
C n  is the largest realized value of the betweenness centrality ( )
B i
C n . The 
denominator 3 2( 4 5 2) 2g g g− + −  is the maximum difference sum of the actor–level 
betweenness centrality7. This index reaches its maximum value of 1 in a star network 
                                                                                                                                                        
reachable, there are ( 1) 2g g −  paths connecting the unordered pairs in the network and of these, 1g−  
are connected to
i
n , so the maximum betweenness centrality is then 
2max ( ) ( 1) 2 ( 1) ( 1)( 2) 2 ( 3 2) 2
B i
C n g g g g g g g= − − − = − − = − + . 
7 According to Freeman (1979), the betweenness-based network centralization index is defined as the 
average differences between the relative centrality of the most central actor and that of all other actors. 
This calculation of standardized indices can be made equivalently with the network centralization based 
on betweenness as follows:  
= =
= =
   
− −       
− −
− − − −    
− + − +      
= = = =
− −
− − + − + −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
* *
* *
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 3 2
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( 1)( 2) 2 ( 1)( 2) 2 3 2 3 2
.
1 1 ( 1)( 3 2) ( 4 5 2) 2
g g
g g
B i B iB B
B B i B B i
i i
i i
B
C n C nC n C n
C n C n C n C n
g g g g g g g g
C
g g g g g g g g
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and reaches its minimum value of 0 if all actors in the network are equal in 
betweenness.  
    As can be seen in Table 3, the average value of normalized actor–level betweenness 
centrality in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry follows an increasing trend 
from 1991 to 1994, reaching a peak value of 1.26 in 1994, whereas it appears to have a 
decreasing trend from 1994 on, declining to 0.64 in 1998. The maximum value of this 
centrality substantially increases from 0.43 in 1991 to 25.44 in 1995 before declining to 
11.62 in 1996, and then it remains relatively stable until 1998. In terms of the specific 
company’s normalized betweenness centrality, Schering Plough, which is the most 
central firm in the time period 1991–1998 regarding its highest degree centrality and 
closeness centrality, appears to be the most important firm as well when betweenness 
centrality is taken into account (Table 4). It can be seen from Figure 4 that Schering 
Plough plays an important role in the communication between Du Pont and Incyte 
Pharmaceuticals. If Schering Plough fails to pass on information, Du Pont will not 
reach Incyte Pharmaceuticals any more. In contrast, University of British Columbia, 
Children’s and Women’s Health Center of British Columbia hardly fall on any geodesic 
pathways between other pairs of firms. They only form a small research cluster with 
Base4 Bioinformatics at an isolated network position that seems to be nearly 
disconnected from knowledge generated outside this small cluster (Figure 4).  
    With regard to the betweenness–based network centralization, the centralization 
score dramatically increases from 0.42% in 1991 to 24.37% in 1995 before decreasing to 
10.42% in 1997, and it slightly increases again to 11.17% in 1998 (Table 3). These 
network centralization values are rather low in the time period 1991 to 1993, and in 
1991 and 1992, they are even lower than the values of the degree–based centralization 
index (Table 1). However, in contrast to the low value of degree–based network 
centralization during the period 1994 to 1998, the observed values in betweenness index 
with the peak value of 24.37% in 1995 are moderately high. This indicates that even 
though most firms in the pharmaceutical biotechnology sector are linked to the R&D 
network, some of them are more active than others. 
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3.4   Most Important Players 
 
    Based on the actor–level centrality measures that have been discussed above, there 
are three advantages for a firm to be the most important player in a network: First of 
all, they have more contacts than others, that is, they have more opportunities to 
obtain information and resources than other firms within a network. Secondly, when 
they are at a more central position in the network, they are more reachable by other 
firms at shorter path lengths. This structural advantage allows them to interact with 
other firms quickly and access information more rapidly. The third advantage is that 
they are situated on more pathways between other pairs of firms. This allows them to 
broker contracts among other firms or prevent contracts by isolating other firms 
(Gulati, 1999; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In Table 4, we have chosen the 40 most 
important players from the pharmaceutical biotechnology network in the time period 
1991–1998 based on their centrality scores of degree, closeness and betweenness. In 
order to visualize a firm’s position and interactions in the network, a graph containing 
186 companies8 in the pharmaceutical biotechnology R&D network in the period 1991–
1998 is presented (Figure 4). In this graph, the size of the node is adjusted by firm’s 
degree centrality: the bigger node in Figure 4 represents the firm with higher degree 
centrality. Particularly, the nodes of “important” and “non–important” companies are 
depicted by different colours: red nodes for the 40 most important firms (Table 4) and 
blue node for the remaining companies (Figure 4).  
As Table 4 shows, 10% of the 40 most important companies in the pharmaceutical 
biotechnology sector engage in commerce on both pharmaceutics and biotech, such as 
Corixa, Millennium Pharmaceuticals and Roche. The business of Amersham Pharmacia 
Biotech, as its name shows, is also twofold, since it results from a merger between 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies (i.e., UK–based Amersham International, 
Sweden–based Pharmacia Biotech and Norway–based Nycomed). Biotechnology firms 
account for 37.5%, while pharmaceutical companies account for 52.5% of the most 
important players of the pharmaceutical biotechnology sector (Table 4), which may 
imply that pharmaceutical firms play a more dominant role than biotechnology firms 
during 1991–1998. As can be seen in Table 4, the number one of the 40 most important 
                                                 
8 Due to a large number of pharmaceutical biotechnology companies that engaged in partnerships during 
the time period 1991–1998, it was impossible to draw the entire R&D network. For this reason, we have 
shrunk the network by removing firms with a degree centrality of less than 5.  
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players is the US–based pharmaceutical company Schering Plough (marked in bold) 
with the highest centrality score on all measures of degree, closeness and betweenness 
in the research network. Other large established pharmaceutical companies, such as 
Pfizer and SmithKline Beckman have also become nodal network players in the 1990s 
that are embedded in dense local research clusters with many participating partners 
(Figure 4). An important driving force here is possibly the second wave of the 
molecular biological revolution: genetic engineering, which opened up completely new 
areas for innovation (Gilsing et al., 2008). 
    The trend of the development in the pharmaceutical biotechnology network during 
the 1990s, however, is in contrast to that during the 1980s, as some authors proposed. 
Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2006) indicated that with the emergence of biotechnology 
during the 1980s, the small entrepreneurial biotechnological firms had a leading role in 
the inter–firm R&D network. Also, they formed important bridges between research 
sub–networks surrounding large pharmaceutical companies. But in the 1990s, as Figure 
4 shows, the importance of these biotechnology firms decreased in the research network 
in comparison to the role of large pharmaceutical companies. Also, during this period, 
the role of these biotechnology firms as bridges between major sub–networks became 
less prominent. Overall, large pharmaceutical companies have developed into dominant 
star players with multiple partnerships while occupying central roles in the R&D 
network during 1991–1998. Nevertheless, in a long–term perspective, the 
entrepreneurial biotechnology firms will remain crucial partners for pharmaceutical 
companies due to the mutual dependence between the pharmaceutical industry and the 
biotechnology sector (Roijakkers, 2003).  
    The section above provides insights into the development of inter–firm 
pharmaceutical biotechnology R&D networks over time by evaluating the importance 
of network participants and research cooperation at the general network level with 
descriptive statistics based on the conceptions and measures of actor–level centrality 
and network–level centralization. In the next section, we will apply the econometrical 
techniques and Burt’s (1992) “structural hole” theory to identify what actually 
determines a firm’s centrality–based partnering capability in an inter–firm 
pharmaceutical biotechnology R&D network.   
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Figure 4: Inter–firm R&D network amongst cooperating companies in pharmaceutical biotechnology, 1991–1998; source: Recombinant Capital.
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4   Determinants of Firm’s Centrality–based Network 
Capability: An Empirical Perspective 
 
 
4.1   Hypotheses 
 
    In the dynamic and fiercely competitive pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, it is 
important for companies to keep pace with constantly developing innovations and meet 
changing customers’ needs. The success of a company is influenced by its ability to 
access diversified contacts with a variety of other firms to develop research resources. 
As a result, choosing suitable partners becomes crucial for improving a firm’s position 
in an inter–firm network. As indicated by the social network literature, the partner 
selecting skills of a firm are characterized by efficiency, which refers to the idea of 
avoiding the maintenance of redundant partnerships that carry little additional 
information (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992). Redundant contacts not only provide 
redundant information, but also generate costs from building and maintaining them 
(Gulati, 1995 and 1999; Kale and Singh, 1999). However, if they were optimally 
avoided, firms could save the time and resources invested in unnecessary duplication of 
contacts and could use more resources to access valuable information from useful 
partnerships. Hence, strategic firms should carefully determine the additional value 
brought by new contacts and build up a non–duplicative network to gain adequate 
transfer of information. Within such an efficient network firms also have the advantage 
to create brokerage positions with control over information flows between other 
partners, thus attaining a central position in the network. Therefore, it is expected that 
a company with higher efficiency level would have larger centrality–based partnering 
capability.    
 
Hypothesis 1: In the pharmaceutical biotechnology network, the level of efficiency of a 
firm is positively correlated with its centrality–based partnering capability.  
 
    The inter–firm cooperation between pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology 
firms can also be explained by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976). 
According to this resource–based view, different firms can be seen as different bundles 
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of resources. If a firm wants to exploit its stock of resources, it will be necessary to 
acquire complementary resources externally (Grant, 1991). This is especially the case in 
the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry. Alongside the usual difficulties of star–up 
companies, the biotechnology firms need large amounts of capital to fund costly 
research, market expertises and experiences with the regulatory approval process 
(Powell, 1998). Allying with large established pharmaceutical companies could provide 
them with a set of organizational capabilities and resources that they are lacking. 
Although the large pharmaceutical companies play a dominant role in the 
commercialization process, they often have been unable to create an internal research 
environment that would foster constant discovery and innovation. The biotechnology 
firms, however, could make up for this lack of internal capabilities and resources 
through various kinds of partnerships (Arora and Gambardelly, 1994; Powell et al., 
1996). As outlined above, there is a certain degree of mutual dependence developed in 
the R&D relationship between pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology firms. In 
this industry, a company with more dependency on complementary resources would 
have more opportunities to access multiple sources from the network and develop their 
innovative capabilities, and in turn, increase its ability to strategically place itself in a 
central network position among other firms. Thus, one might expect that firms with 
more dependency on complementary resources would have larger centrality–based 
partnering capability.  
 
Hypothesis 2: In the pharmaceutical biotechnology network, a firm’s dependency on its 
complementary resources is positively correlated with its centrality–based partnering 
capability.  
 
    Another feature of the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry is that it follows rapid 
unforeseen technological changes that have a major effect on the management of 
innovation within firms and also on their partnering activities (Eisenhardt and Bird–
Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993). It requires firms to identify new projects quickly 
and to launch them into the market strategically. This ability could be improved by a 
firm’s experiences at managing inter–firm partnership. Firms with more partnering 
experiences may increase their specific knowledge about when to form a partnership, 
whom to partner with, and how to value external sources of technological knowledge, 
and in turn, they could effectively react to unexpected events that may occur in its 
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links to other firms and locate themselves in information–rich positions which are 
central in the network (Gulati, 1999; Levinthal and March, 1993). In other words, the 
development of a firm’s experience at managing partnerships enables it to find a well–
developed network position and thus increase its centrality–based partnering capability. 
Furthermore, more experiences at managing partnerships allow the firm to build up its 
reputation as skilled and knowledgeable partner. This makes it an attractive partner 
for other companies in the network, and hence the firm could better access sources 
from others and gain competitive advantages to obtain a central network position 
(Brass et al., 1998; Hagedoorn et al., 2006). This leads to the next hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 3: In the pharmaceutical biotechnology network, the partnering experiences 
of a firm are positively correlated with its centrality–based partnering capability.  
 
 
4.2   Research Methods 
 
4.2.1   Research Setting 
 
    The network environment that is chosen here is the global pharmaceutical 
biotechnology sector. In this high–tech sector there is an abundance of inter–firm 
partnerships and substantial R&D partnering activities (Powell, 1998; Walker et al., 
1997). The sector comprises new biotechnology firms dedicated to commercializing the 
new technology such as Genentech, and large pharmaceutical companies such as Eli 
Lilly that participate in biotechnology for drug development and commercialization 
(Rothaermel, 2000). R&D partnerships are an important form of inter–firm 
collaboration in this sector (Hagedoorn and Roijakkers, 2002). As described below, 
there are two main reasons why the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry is 
interesting for the analysis from the perspective of inter–firm strategic networking in 
the context of R&D partnerships.  
    First of all, the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry provides a prime example for 
studying the development of inter–firm R&D collaboration. The historical background 
of this sector is interesting and unique. During the 1950s and 1960s, large 
pharmaceutical companies mainly followed a “going–it–alone” research strategy so that 
inter–firm R&D collaboration did not play a crucial role (Roijakkers, 2003). However, 
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along with the biotechnology revolution in the 1970s, the pharmaceutical industry 
experienced a dramatic change in knowledge and technology developments and was to 
some extent forced to change their research strategies to include a great variety of 
R&D partnerships (Roijakkers, 2003). Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, technological 
collaboration continued to be a significant feature in the pharmaceutical biotechnology 
industry. Secondly, the cooperation formed in the pharmaceutical biotechnology 
industry has led to the emergence of a strong dual market structure, which is developed 
by large established pharmaceutical companies and small research–intensive 
biotechnology firms (Powell et al., 2005; Saviotti, 1998). The capabilities and resources 
of these two groups of firms were complementary, resulting in numerous inter–firm 
partnerships in the R&D network.  
In this research setting, balanced panel data was applied, since a panel data set 
follows a given sample of cases over time (in this case, pharmaceutical biotechnology 
companies), thus providing multiple observations on each of the cases in the sample 
(Baltagi, 1995). Based on actor–level centrality measures (as discussed in Section 3), 
only those companies, which were considered to be the most important players in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology sector during the period 1991–1998 (Table 4 in Section 
3), were selected. However, in the empirical setting, the time period was shortened to 
1995–1998 because from the mid–1990s, a new pattern of innovation emerged in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology sector where innovation was largely concentrated in 
dense networks of inter–firm R&D partnerships (Roijakkers, 2003). Therefore, the 
sample that was analysed comprised the 40 most important pharmaceutical 
biotechnology companies that were cooperating through multiple partnerships during 
the period 1995–1998 leading to 160 observations.  
 
 
4.2.2   Variables  
 
    The dependent variable that was used to describe a firm’s partnering centrality–
based capability within a network is the logarithm form of the betweenness centrality, 
which indicates the percentage change in betweenness centrality as an extra unit 
change in the explanatory variable. As shown in Section 3, the betweenness measure of 
centrality is based on the idea that the player positions itself on the shortest path 
between other pairs of players in the network and it regards a firm’s capacity to 
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control information exchange between other companies in a network. The more firms 
depend on a focal firm to make linkages with other firms, the more power and influence 
this focal firm gains. In this study, normalized centrality measure of betweenness was 
used because an absolute measure of betweenness cannot be used to compare firms’ 
centralities for different sizes of network. This normalized measure ranges between 0 
and 1, with higher scores indicating greater firm centrality in a network relative to 
other network partners.  
Two of the independent variables are based on the network theory of “structural 
hole” proposed by Burt (1992). According to this author, “structural hole” indicates a 
relationship of non–redundancy between two contacts. By bridging structural holes, the 
player can obtain non–redundant information and in turn occupy an advantageous 
position within the network. In other words, network benefits accrue to those actors, 
who broker connections between unconnected groups of players. For instance, if a 
company knows a lot of other firms which are disconnected from each other, it would 
have the chance to detect and develop brokerage opportunities between them. However, 
if all other firms are all tightly connected, broker opportunities would be difficult to 
attain. There are mainly two conceptions from the theory of “structural hole” that 
could be applied in the current study: efficiency size and hierarchy, both of which are 
well–established measures in the inter–firm network literature (see Abbasi and 
Altmann, 2010; Buskens and Rijt, 2008; Chung and Hossain, 2008; Hagendoorn et al., 
2006; Okoli and Oh, 2007; Roijakkers, 2003).  
    According to social network theory (Burt, 1992), a firm’s efficiency can be indicated 
by its efficiency size, which measures what proportion of a focal firm’s contacts to its 
partners is non–redundant. Hence, the efficiency size of a focal firm i  is the sum of the 
non–redundant portion of i ’s connections with all other firms in the network divided 
by the number of its partnerships, N . It can be normally defined as 
 
1
= 1 ,  ,
i iq jq
j q
Efficiency p m q i j
N
 
− ≠ 
 
∑ ∑                        (7) 
 
where 
iq jq
p m  denotes that the information access, timing, and referrals the focal firm i  
gets through its contact j  are redundant to the extent that firm i  has a substantial 
investment of time and energy in a relationship with another partner, q , to whom its 
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partner j  has a strong relation9. Aggregating 
iq jq
p m  across all contacts q  measures the 
portion of i ’s relationship with j  that is redundant to i ’s relations with its other 
primary contacts. Thus, 1 minus this expression is the non–redundant portion of the 
relationship. With respect to the “structural hole” theory, the sum across relationships 
of the non–redundant portion divided by the number of the focal firm i ’s total links is 
the normalized number of non–redundant contacts in firm i ’s network. This efficiency 
ratio varies from a minimum approaching 0, indicating high contact redundancy which 
implies low efficiency, to a maximum of 1, indicating that every contact in the network 
is non–redundant. 
    Efficiency size (as discussed above) can be used to indicate the efficiency level of a 
focal firm’s network and therefore is a suitable measure for Hypothesis 1. To test the 
prediction of Hypothesis 2, a hierarchy measure was used in this study, which is in fact 
an adjustment of a constraint measure. Constraint indicates the degree of dependency 
in the partnerships of a firm. In other words, it measures the extent to which a firm 
has partners that cooperate intensely among themselves (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). 
For instance, if a focal firm i ’s partners all have many potential partners on their own, 
the constraint posed on firm i  is high. However, if the local network of firm i  is 
sparsely linked so that its partners do not have other alternatives in the neighbourhood, 
the degree of constraint posed on firm i  would be low. According to Burt (1992), 
constraint refers to the focal firm i ’s investment in reaching partner j  multiplied by 
the lack of structural holes around j  with which firm i  could negotiate a favourable 
rate of return on investment. Investment is defined as the proportion of the focal firm 
i ’s network time and energy that leads to partner j  and the lack of holes around j . 
Their product defines partner j ’s constraint on firm i : 
 
2
( 's investment in reaching )(lack of holes around )= ,
ij ij iq qj j
q
c i j j p p p O i q j
 
= + ≠ ≠ 
 
∑  (8) 
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iq
p  is the proportion of firm i ’s network time and energy invested in the relationship with partner q  
(interaction with q  divided by the sum of firm i ’s relations), ( )   = + + ≠
  
∑( ) ,iq iq qi ij ji
j
p z z z z i j , and 
jq
m denotes the marginal strength of partner j ’s relation with contact q  (interaction with q  divided by 
the strongest relation of j ), = + + ≠( ) max( ),
jq jq qj jk kj
m z z z z j k , where 
ij
z , a general cell of matrix Z 
transformed from the dichotomized matrix, is the network variable measuring the strength of the 
relation from i  to j  (Burt, 1982).  
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and the aggregate constraint on firm i , = ∑ ij
j
C c , is the sum of constraint from i ’s 
partnership with each of the N  partners10. The partner–specific constraint ranges from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1, with 1 representing that j  is the only partner of 
firm i  and 0 representing that j  has no partnership with firms with whom firm i  
could replace partner j  (Burt, 1992).  
    Hierarchy, which describes the nature of the constraint on a focal firm, measures the 
important property of dependency to the extent that it indicates the inequality in the 
distribution of constraints on a focal firm across other firms in its neighbourhood 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). If the total constraint on a focal firm is concentrated on 
a single other actor, the hierarchy measure will have a higher value. If the constraint 
results more equally from multiple companies in the focal firm’s neighbourhood, 
hierarchy will be less. This hierarchy measure can be calculated using the following 
two–step procedure. First, for each partner j  of firm i , the ratio of partner–specific 
constraint to the average level of constraint per partner ij
c
C N
 is computed, where 
C N  is the average constraint per partner.  This ratio indicates how much one specific 
partner j  is considered to be a more severe source of constraint to firm i  than any of 
its other partners. In the next step, the Coleman–Theil disorder index is applied to 
compute the actual hierarchy measure. This method multiplies the sum of all partner–
specific constraint ratios by its natural logarithm and divides the product by the 
maximum sum possible. Thus, the hierarchy measure of a focal firm i  can be stated as 
 
                                                 
10 
iq qj
p p  denotes that firm i ’s entrepreneurial opportunities are constrained to the extent that another of 
firm i ’s partner q , in whom firm i  has invested a large proportion of his network time and energy, has 
invested heavily in a relationship with firm i ’s partner j . Aggregating 
iq qj
p p  across all contacts q  
(excluding firm i ) and adding i ’s direct connection with j  defines firm i ’s investment in reaching 
partner j : + ≠∑ , ,ij iq qj
q
p p p q i j . The lack of structural hole is measured as 
lack of holes around  = ,
ij iq qj j
q
j p p p O i q j
 
 + ≠ ≠
 
 
∑  where jO  denotes the organization of players 
within the cluster around partner j  so that it would be difficult to replace j  by other partners in the 
cluster. 
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( )ln( )
ln( )
ij ij
j
i
c c
C N C N
Hierarchy
N N
=
∑
                              (9) 
 
This measure attains its minimum of 0 when constraint is the same for each partner of 
a firm, and reaches its maximum of 1 when all constraint is concentrated on a single 
partnership.  
    In order to examine Hypothesis 3, the experienced–based independent variable was 
computed. For this, the measure of number of inter–firm R&D partnerships of firms 
was used, since it could reflect the experience of the focal firm in cooperation with 
other firms. The more partnerships a focal firm has, the more cooperative experience it 
gains and the more it benefits from the inter–firm cooperation between companies. 
Based on the inter–firm network literature (e.g., Hagendoorn et al., 2006; Roijakkers, 
2003), indicators of duration and time effects were applied as control variables in this 
study. In the chosen model, the time since the last R&D partnership was established is 
controlled. For this, the variable “duration” was constructed to track the time elapsed 
since the former partnership of firms and set to 0 at the outset. Besides, the presence of 
a particular trend in new R&D partnership formation over time could potentially bias 
the results. To control possible effects of time, the year dummies “time effect (1995–
1998)” were included by using the year 1995 as reference. 
    Dependent variable, efficiency measure, hierarchy measure and the experience–based 
independent variable were all calculated with Ucinet 6 (Borgatti et al., 2002). The 
basic source of information for Ucinet 6 was the Recombinant Capital database, which 
is a binary, symmetric adjacency matrix containing the partnerships between the firms 
in a network. Separate matrices for each year were calculated to obtain the value of the 
network related measures for certain chosen companies.  
 
 
4.2.3   Statistical Methods 
 
    As stated in Hypothesis 1, a firm’s efficiency is predicted to raise its centrality–
based capacity in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry. A firm with higher 
efficiency to choose collaboration partners may have a larger capability to place itself 
in a central position within the network. In this relationship, from the econometrics 
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point of view, it is necessary to consider the potential existence of “reverse causality”, 
where the efficiency of a company is likely determined simultaneously along with its 
centrality–based partnering capability. Some authors (e.g., Hagedoorn and Duysters, 
2002; Hagedoorn et al., 2006) suggest that a company with a central position in an 
inter–firm network would have more information about the position of other firms in 
the network and their information flows, which enables it to use its centrality–based 
capability to delete duplicating partners, thus gaining high efficiency. Therefore, firm’s 
ability to obtain a central position within the network may partially determine the 
level of its efficiency to select suitable partnerships. If the traditional ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method in a linear regression model11:   
 
= +
i i i
y X ß u                                         (10) 
 
is adopted in the presence of reverse causality between firm’s efficiency and its 
centrality–based capability, it is highly likely that this model will be inconsistent, 
meaning that due to the endogeneity of a firm’s efficiency, changes in its efficiency level 
are associated not only with changes in the dependent variable of firm’s centrality–
based capability but also with changes in the error term of the model (see equation 
(10)). What is needed in this case is typically a method to generate only exogenous 
variation for firm’s efficiency level. An obvious way to do this is through an experiment. 
The application of instrumental variables (IV) method provides a way to obtain 
consistent parameter estimates if suitable instruments exist. There are various 
instrumental variable methods that could be applied to a model’s endogeneity problems. 
In this study, the two–stage least squares (2SLS) and the optimal generalized method 
of moments (GMM) were used, the latter of which was named also after the two–step 
feasible efficient GMM.  
    The 2SLS estimator, as its name indicates, is obtained by two consecutive OLS 
regressions: In the first stage, the fitted value of a firm’s efficiency is obtained from the 
OLS regression of the firm’s efficiency on 1, included explanatory variables and 
instrumental variables. In the second stage, we run another regression by OLS of 
dependent variable of the firm’s centrality–based capability on 1, included explanatory 
                                                 
11 
i
y  denotes the centrality–based partnering capability of a focal firm i , 
i
X  denotes the matrix of the 
regressors including firm’s efficiency level and other explanatory variables, ß  is the coefficient estimator 
which ranges from 0 to 1, and 
i
u  is the error term.  
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variables and fitted value of the firm’s efficiency that was obtained in the first stage, 
which gives a consistent 2SLS estimator. Although the 2SLS estimator is consistent, it 
could be inefficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity, which indicates that the error 
terms do not have constant variance. This problem can be partially addressed through 
the use of robust standard errors in the 2SLS model, in which a consistent estimate of 
the variance–covariance matrix for the error term could be derived (Baum et al., 2003 
and 2007). Another solution, introduced by Hansen (1982), is the optimal GMM 
method, which makes use of the orthogonality conditions to allow for efficient 
estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form. If heteriskedasticity 
is indeed present, the optimal GMM estimator is more efficient than the 2SLS 
estimator, whereas if in fact the errors are homoskedastic, the 2SLS estimator would be 
more preferable than the estimator of optimal GMM (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). For this reason, a test for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity is necessary for deciding whether the 2SLS model or the optimal 
GMM is called for. In the model that was chosen here, the presence of 
heteroskedasticity is not completely clear since the standard tests such as Breusch–
Pagan/Godfrey/Cook–Weisberg and White/Koenker test statistics show that 
heteriskedasticity is present in the model, while the Pagan–Hall test statistic (Pagan 
and Hall, 1983) indicates the error terms are homoskedastic. Therefore, both 2SLS 
estimator and GMM estimator will be applied successively to the model. The results 
from the methods of 2SLS, 2SLS with robust standard errors and optimal GMM will be 
presented in this paper.  
    In order to better exhibit the methods that will be used in the research, 2SLS 
estimator and optimal GMM estimator will be given in their original matrix form as 
follows. We now consider the model in equation (10) again, where X  presents a n K×  
matrix of regressors with n  being the number of observations. As discussed above, 
firm’s efficiency to select partnerships is considered to be endogenous, so we need to 
generate exogenous variation for firm’s efficiency level by choosing a n L×  matrix of 
instrumental variables Z . In this case, the number of instruments excluded from the 
equation exceeds the number of included endogenous variables (L K> ), so the applied 
model is overidentified. 2SLS is a common procedure for overidentified model. Given a 
set of K  instruments: −′ ′ ′= =1ˆ ( )
Z
X Z Z Z Z X P X  where 
Z
P denotes the projection matrix 
−
′ ′
1( )Z Z Z Z , the 2SLS estimator can be written as 
− −
′ ′ ′ ′= =
1 1
2
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
SLS Z Z
ß X X X y X P X X P y (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). 
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The standard 2SLS estimator can be regarded as a special case of GMM estimator and 
under the exogeneity assumption of instrumental variable, =( ) 0
i i
E Z u , we now shortly 
derive a linear GMM model. GMM requires that a certain number of moment 
conditions were specified for the model, such as L  instruments generating a set of L  
moment conditions, ′ ′= = −ˆ ˆ( ) ( ),
i i i i i i
g ß Z u Z y X ß  where 
i
g is 1L ×  matrix. These 
moment conditions are functions of the model parameters and the data, such that their 
expectation is zero at the true values of the parameters: =( ( )) 0
i
E g ß . Since each of the 
L  moment equations corresponds to a sample moment, we can write these L  sample 
moments as 
=
′ ′= − =∑
1
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
n
i i i
i
g ß Z y X ß Z u
n n
 (Wooldridge, 2002).  The GMM method 
then minimizes a certain norm of the sample averages of the moment conditions, 
′=
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )J ß ng ß Wg ß  where W  is a L L×  symmetric weighting matrix (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009). GMM estimator is consistent for any symmetric positive definite 
weighting matrix W , however, the efficiency of this estimator is not guaranteed for an 
arbitrary W , which possibly leads to an inefficient estimator in GMM. Hansen (1982) 
chooses optimal weighting matrix −= 1W S  (S  is the covariance matrix of the moment 
conditions to produce the most efficient estimator) to produce the most efficient or 
optimal GMM estimator, which can be written as − − −′ ′ ′ ′= 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
OGMM
ß X ZS Z X X ZS Z y  
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). 
    Even when 2SLS and optimal GMM is judged to be the appropriate estimation 
technique, we may still question its validity in a given application. “Good instruments” 
should be both valid and relevant (Baum et al., 2003). In order to evaluate the validity 
of the instruments, we may cast some lights on whether the instruments are 
independent from an unobservable error process in the context of an overidentified 
model. If orthogonality conditions were satisfied to the extent that instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term, the instrumental variables would be valid. To test 
this validity of the instruments, we could make use of the overidentification test: In 
terms of GMM, the overidentifying restrictions may be tested via the commonly 
employed J  statistic of Hansen (1982), while Sargan’s statistic (Sargan, 1958), which 
uses an estimate of the error variance from the IV or 2SLS regression with the full set 
of overidentifying restrictions, is largely used for 2SLS method. By computing the 
difference–in–Sargan test or difference–in–J statistics, the endogeneity test, which is 
essentially testing whether the instrumental variable method is required to estimate the 
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model, can be implemented (Baum et al., 2003). This test is equivalent to estimating 
the same regression but treating the regressor as exogenous, and then testing the 
corresponding orthogonality conditions. The null hypothesis of this test is that the 
specified endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous. To address the 
relevance of the instrumental variable, we need to consider whether the instruments are 
correlated with the endogenous regressor. If the instruments are both correlated with 
the endogenous variable and orthogonal to the error process, the 2SLS estimator or 
GMM estimator will be consistent. However, to ensure an indeed good performance of 
the IV estimator, it should be considered whether the instruments are weak. The 
concept of a weak instrument is that the correlations between the endogenous regressor 
and the excluded instruments are nonzero but small (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Thus, if low correlation exists between the instrument and the endogenous variable 
being instrumented, the model is said to be weakly identified. In order to test the 
presence of weak instruments, the Stock–Yogo test (Stock and Yogo, 2005), which 
makes use of F–statistic form of the Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic, is commonly 
carried out.  
    The statistical methods of 2SLS and GMM and the tests for “good instruments” 
that are discussed above can be implemented by using Stata 11 (StataCorp, 2009), 
which is a statistical software package for data management, data analysis, and 
graphics. In this study, the data that was computed with Ucinet 6 (Borgatti et al., 
2002) based on Recombinant Capital database (see Section 4.2.2) was imported into 
the software Stata, and processed with the relevant commands. In particular, the 
“ivreg2 package” was applied (Baum et al., 2002), which provides the extension to 
Stata software and is a suitable package for the panel data.  
 
 
4.2.4   Choice of Instrumental Variables  
 
    As discussed in Section 4.2.3, due to reverse causality, a firm’s efficiency, which is 
likely to be endogenous, needs to be instrumented with exogenous variables. In order to 
generate sufficient exogenous variation, a few instruments were considered to solve the 
endogenous problem. One candidate for the instrument is the firm’s clustering 
coefficient, which is calculated by the proportion of cooperation that exists between 
firms and its neighbourhood divided by the number of cooperation that could possibly 
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exist between them. This concept could be further interpreted as the probability of 
which two collaborated partners of one firm in the network are connected to each other 
(Cantner and Rake, 2011), which is simply an indicator of the density of a firm’s local 
neighbourhood (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). The clustering coefficient is likely to 
influence a firm’s efficiency to choose partners in the sense that the dense contacts 
among a firm’s partnerships may cause redundant information and consequently reduce 
a firm’s efficiency. This instrument can be calculated with the software Ucinet 6 
(Borgatti et al., 2002). The second candidate for the instrument could be the sector 
dummy of biotechnology. The biotechnology driven by innovation and discovery is 
largely used in manifold industrial manufacturing processes. Its advanced technical 
process, which reduces the environmental impact, improves the process efficiency and 
lowers the production costs, has advantages over traditional pharmaceutical process 
(EU, 2007). In a study on the Canadian biotechnology industry, Baum et al. (2000) 
found that biotechnology firms that were better able to leverage alliances, in particular 
R&D alliances, grew at higher rates than others. Similar results were found in a 
comprehensive EU study on the biotechnology industry in Europe (EU, 2002). The 
question, whether the sector is biotechnology is important to the firm’s efficiency, 
because the biotechnology firms with newly updated, non–redundant information could 
efficiently choose the suitable partners by themselves in a rapidly developing 
technological environment.  
    Besides, a firm’s national–geographic origin may also influence its efficiency to the 
extent that firms from various countries may have different levels of efficiency in 
gaining technological information. For instance, in the US, biotechnology is 
characterised by a high degree of concentration of firms in a restricted number of 
geographic regions. A similar process of clustering has taken place across Europe, with 
examples such as the biotech–region Munich and the Medicon Valley shared by Sweden 
and Denmark. However, in comparison with the US company structure, the majority of 
European biotechnology clusters do not seem to be big enough to compete effectively 
with those in the US (EU, 2007). In order to control for these effects, a set of national 
origin dummies was considered: US, England, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Sweden and Ireland. Among these national dummies, US, Germany and Denmark 
indicate closer correlations to the efficiency of a firm. Therefore, these three country 
dummies were included into the instrumental variable list. Another candidate for the 
instrumental variable could be the firm’s age, which can be simply calculated from the 
 37 
firm’s foundation year. Firm’s age is related to the firm’s efficiency in the way that 
older firms with a higher number of cooperative arrangements are more experienced in 
the industry than younger firms (Rothaermel, 2002). Hence, older firms are more likely 
to detect opportunities for building up non–redundant contacts in the network and are 
thus more efficient in choosing partnerships.  
    Therefore, clustering coefficient, firm’s age, sector dummy of biotechnology, and 
national dummies of US, Germany and Denmark were used in this study as 
instrumental variables to generate exogenous variation for the firm’s efficiency, which is 
considered to be endogenous. All these instruments are likely to influence a firm’s 
efficiency level, but will not directly determine the dependent variable of a firm’s 
centrality–based partnering capability.  
    In order to obtain data for instrumental variables, we collected information on the 
national origin, foundation year and industrial sector provided by each firm in our 
population. Various sources of information were used such as the Institute for 
Biotechnology Information (BioSpace, BioCentury, and Funding Universe), US Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) / Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR), 
Bloomberg Businessweek and Washington Post’s Linkages.  
 
 
4.3   Results 
 
    Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of explanatory variables for the 160 
observations in the sample and a correlation matrix. The variances were relatively low 
on all variables since the sample only represents the prominent firms in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry over years, which would not cause huge data 
differences between observations. And as would be expected, the dependent variable 
(the logarithm form of betweenness centrality) was highly correlated with the 
normalized number of firm’s partnerships. Table 6 displays the estimation results of 
instrumental variable panel models using Stata 11(StataCorp, 2009). In model 1 and 
model 2 the standard 2SLS procedure was used, in which the independent error terms 
are assumed to be homoskedastic, while in model 3 and model 4 the 2SLS estimator 
was also used but the error terms of the models are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Optimal GMM method, which allows for efficient estimation in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, was used for model 5 to model 7. It can be seen from Table 6 that 
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the p–value in the endogeneity test was less than 1% in all models, so we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the firm’s efficiency may be treated as exogenous. Thus, firm’s 
efficiency is endogenous and instrumental variable methods are the appropriate 
estimation technique in our setting. As Table 6 also shows, the p–values in the 
overidentification test for model 1—model 7 were all larger than 10%, hence, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the 
residuals, which implies the instrumental variables that we chose are valid. However, 
the F statistics in Stock–Yogo test (Stock and Yogo, 2005) suggest that these 
instrumental variables could probably be weak instruments and the models are 
therefore weakly instrumented.  
In model 1, model 3 and model 5, we estimated firm’s centrality–based partnering 
capability as a function of its efficiency level, its dependency on complementary 
resource, its experience at managing partnerships, its duration in the partnerships and 
time effects (1996–1998). As time effects of 1996 and 1998 did not seem to affect firm’s 
ability to be central (see Table 6), we dropped both of them in model 2, model 4 and 
model 6. After dropping time effects of 1996 and 1998, firm’s efficiency did not appear 
to significantly influence firm’s partnering capability anymore in model 6, even though 
it exerted influence in model 5. So we reestimated model 6 by excluding the clustering 
coefficient and country dummy Denmark from the instrumental variable list. As a 
result, the significance level of firm’s dependency on complementary resources changed 
from level 10% to 5%, and firm’s efficiency had impact again on its centrality–based 
capability as shown in model 7 (Table 6). Also, as we respecified the instruments list, 
the p–value in the overidentification test became larger when comparing model 7 to 
model 6. With the same set of variables, the models using methods of 2SLS and 2SLS 
with robust standard errors had exactly the same coefficient estimates, but different 
standard errors due to the potential presence of heteroskedaticity. However, after we 
reestimated the overidentified model using the optimal GMM method, the coefficients’ 
point estimated changed slightly and standard errors decreased (Table 6), which 
generally indicates the model to be more efficient. 
We hypothesized that firm’s efficiency level is expected to have a positive impact on 
firm’s centrality–based network capability (Hypothesis 1). The estimates of the 
indicator for firm’s efficiency (efficiency size) were positive and significantly different 
from zero in the 2SLS models, 2SLS with robust standard error models and also in the 
optimal GMM models (only model 5 and 7). Thus, the instrumental variable methods 
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provide evidences that support a firm’s efficiency to choose suitable partners as an 
important factor to determine its centrality–based partnering capability. Hypothesis 2 
argues that the more a firm is dependent on its complementary resources, the higher 
the centrality–based network capability of this firm is. Model 1—model 7 all present 
that the estimates of the indicator for dependency (hierarchy measure 12) have a 
significant, negative effect on firm’s betweenness centrality. So a firm’s dependency on 
its complementary resources was identified in the present study as another crucial 
factor for determining a firm’s centrality–based partnering capability. Hypothesis 3 
predicted that a firm with more experiences at managing partnerships tend to have a 
larger centrality–based network capability. The estimates of the indicator for firm’s 
partnering experiences (normalized number of firm’s partnerships) in all of the models 
in Table 6 are positive and differ significantly from zero which implies a positive 
impact on a firm’s ability to act centrally. Firm’s partnering experience is therefore also 
an essential determinant for its centrality–based network capability. In sum, all three 
hypotheses are largely supported by the instrumental variable panel models and the 
results clearly indicate that a firm’s efficiency, its dependency on its complementary 
resources and its experience at managing its partnerships are relevant determinative 
factors for a firm’s centrality–based partnering capability. 
 
 
4.4   Discussion  
 
    Firms that are centrally positioned within a network can better control and exploit 
worthwhile opportunities for obtaining information through links to other firms, and in 
turn gain competitive advantages in the marketplace. This central position of a firm 
plays an especially important role in the high technology industry with substantial 
innovation and knowledge transfer between different sectors. From a managerial 
perspective, positioning the firm centrally requires capable managers to improve their 
information efficiency and their skills to choose suitable partners. The results of the 
present study suggest that it is beneficial for managers to get access to information 
through a number of diverse contacts, avoiding duplicating contacts which leads to 
inefficient networks. Besides, the manager may also keep in mind that a partner may 
                                                 
12 Hierarchy measure is negatively related to firm’s dependency on its complementary resources as 
discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
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either unpredictably free–ride by limiting its dedication in an inter–firm cooperation or 
simply adopt opportunistic behaviours, which could cause informational hurdles in the 
cooperation network (Gulati, 1995). Thus, a good access to market information is 
essential to find an appropriate partner. Firms can learn about potential partner’s 
capability and reliability from many sources, one of which is their network of prior 
collaborators, which enhances trust both by providing information about each other’s 
reliability and by reinforcing a concern for reputation. Apart from selecting linkages 
based on past partners, managers could also choose to build up network resources by 
seeking out partnerships with central firms (Gulati, 1999), since connecting to well–
positioned companies with a high network status is more valuable for the knowledge 
and information transfer than just being connected to others in a network of whatever 
positioned (Hagedooen and Duysters, 2002). Another network strategy that a manager 
could adopt is to anticipate their network participations and strategically initiate 
selective network contacts. Inter–firm networks serve as strategic resources that 
managers can proactively design for future choices and develop over time to meet their 
objectives (Walter et al., 2007). Therefore, in order to better organize the cooperative 
relationships and thus attain a central position in a high–tech network environment, 
the managers can take a forward–looking view on the desired network structure of 
partners in the future and work backward on their current network strategy (Gulati, 
1999).  
    Choosing appropriate R&D partnerships is a crucial step for practicing managers in 
an innovative high technology industry, since it can affect the success of a firm’s 
innovation strategies and the effectiveness of a firm’s R&D capabilities. Obviously, 
R&D partnerships are important external sources of a firm, through which it can access 
knowledge and innovation generated outside its technological cluster. However, firms 
can only identify and acquire relevant external knowledge through internal R&D 
activities, especially internal learning capacities, since they determine the extent to 
which a firm can assimilate and exploit new knowledge from other firms. This is also 
called absorptive capacity, which was defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). 
Investing in such absorptive capacity allows a firm to effectively exploit external 
information for its own use. Nicholls–Nixon (1993) investigated the effects of absorptive 
capacity in pharmaceutical companies’ responses to the technological discontinuity 
brought by newly founded biotechnology firms, and found out that firms with high 
levels of absorptive capacity invested more in their own R&D and managed 
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communications more effectively with their cooperation partners. Thus, internal 
capabilities and external collaboration are complementary but not substitutes for one 
another, which means that firms need both capacities to develop their innovation 
strategy successfully (Powell and Brantley, 1992; Powell et al., 1996). From a 
managerial perspective, balancing an internal innovation strategy with an external 
R&D partnering strategy is an important strategic decision for firms’ innovativeness 
(Roijakkers, 2003; Vanhees, 2006). In a high degree of technological uncertainty that 
surrounds industrial development, firms that manage to have a high level of internal 
capability and external R&D partnering, would be capable to obtain competitive 
advantage and superior financial performance in the high–tech research network 
(Santos, 2003).  
    In particular, from a managerial perspective on the pharmaceutical biotechnology 
research networks, these large pharmaceutical companies should develop their research 
capability by using a variety of R&D partnerships with small biotechnology, but they 
should avoid time–consuming and costly partnering activities with companies that are 
not operating at the forefront of knowledge seeking and technology development 
(Hagendoorn et al., 2006). Small biotechnology firms should operate their business with 
rather different strategies due to their weak positions in the high–tech market in 
comparison to large pharmaceutical companies. It is highly possible that once the large 
pharmaceutical companies have absorbed critical knowledge from the smaller 
biotechnology firms, they would discontinue their partnerships with these small 
partners (Roijakkers et al., 2005). Thus, to survive in the fiercely competitive high–tech 
industry, biotechnology firms not only need to develop up–to–date technological 
knowledge and build up linkages to large pharmaceutical companies for funding their 
launching projects, but also need to develop long–term network strategy in terms of 
avoiding over–dependence on a few large pharmaceutical companies.  
 
 
 
5   Conclusions 
 
    Economics provides insights into the inter–firm R&D network in the sense that the 
combined value of the resources resulting from a firm’s cooperation exceeds the sum of 
resources coming from their separated economic activities. From the view of theoretical 
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network formation, a firm’s incentive to form parwise links results from its reciprocal 
interests and maximizing a firm’s incentive in partnerships may lead to a tension 
between individual incentive and social welfare. In most cases, R&D collaborations 
appear to generate positive effects on the societal welfare, so government policies 
generally encourage technological cooperation between high technology firms. In a 
high–tech environment with rapidly developing knowledge and innovation, research 
cooperations are an essential strategy for firms to become more successful. As a result, 
the R&D cooperation network in the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry has 
experienced a significant evolutional change in its size and structure during 1991–1998.  
    Not only network structure, but also a firm’s strategic position in the network 
influences the proceeds from the inter–firm R&D cooperation. Central firms obtain 
information much more easily and rapidly and hence occupy advantageous structural 
positions in a research network, while peripheral firms hardly gain any benefits from 
participating in the cooperation. There are three structural properties to the actor 
centrality as summarized by Wasserman and Faust (1994): degree, closeness, and 
betweenness. Degree centrality takes only direct neighbours of an actor into account 
and if the indirect contacts need to be considered, we look upon closeness centrality, 
which measures the distance from one actor to all other actors in the network. The 
closeness centrality of an actor increases when the total distance to all other actors 
decreases. The importance of an actor for the circulation of information is captured by 
the concept of betweenness centrality. An actor with higher score of betweenness is 
more likely to be a link in more information chains between other actors and thereby 
has an important role as an intermediary in the communication network. Based on 
these measures, a list of the most important firms in the time period 1991–1998 was 
compiled. More than half of these firms are pharmaceutical companies, indicating that 
pharmaceutical companies may play a more dominant role than biotechnology firms in 
the 1990s. From the descriptive analysis (Table 4 in Section 3) and graphical 
illustration (Figure 4 in Section 3), it becomes evident that pharmaceutical companies 
have indeed developed into dominant star players with multiple partnerships while 
holding central roles in the R&D network during the 1990s.  
    Apart from evaluating the network on the individual level, this paper also provides 
the conceptions of network–level centralization and examines the research cooperation 
on the level of the entire network. Three distinct structural properties (degree, 
closeness and betweenness) that have been defined as bases for developing measures of 
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actor–level centrality were also used to construct indices of network–level centralization. 
The results from the descriptive analysis show that both degree–based and 
betweenness–based network centralization are not high in the time period 1991–1998, 
which implies that the distribution of overall positional advantages in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry is, to a large degree, not unequal and even 
though most firms in this sector are linked to the R&D network, some of them are 
more active than others. 
    In the empirical part (Section 4), we applied panel data to determine the factors 
that could influence firm’s centrality–based partnering capability in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology by using the network theory of “structural hole” and statistical methods 
of 2SLS and optimal GMM. Our results suggest that firm’s efficiency, firm’s 
dependency on its complementary resources and firm’s experiences at managing 
partnerships are important determinants for firm’s centrality–based partnering 
capability. Our findings also have implications for the practicing managers in the high 
technology industry. For instance, if managers want to keep the company in the inter–
firm partnerships with valuable contacts, it is necessary for them to improve their 
partner selecting skills. Practicing managers can meet their objectives by implementing 
different network strategies, such as selecting linkages based on past partners, seeking 
out partnerships with central firms, or proactively designing their future partner 
choices. Furthermore, in order to obtain competitive advantage and superior financial 
performance in the high–tech R&D network, balancing internal innovation strategies 
with external R&D partnering strategies is also crucial for practicing managers. 
Specifically, in the pharmaceutical biotechnology sector, the large pharmaceutical 
companies need to be selective in choosing partners and avoid time–wasting 
cooperations with partners who are technologically outdated, while small biotechnology 
firms need to keep pace with rapidly changing innovative developments and meanwhile 
avoid over–dependence on a few large pharmaceutical partners.  
    Our study not only has empirical and managerial implications for understanding the 
firm’s strategic partnering behaviour, it also has some theoretical implications. The 
results from the empirical analysis potentially points out the relation between the 
centrality measure and the conceptions in the network theory of “structural hole”, 
which implies that the network theory can be used as an instrument to improve our 
understanding of a firm’s strategic behaviour in establishing its partnerships. In this 
context, management literature on inter–firm networks can be inspired from the 
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conceptual ideas of network theory to improve the understanding of relevant issues, 
such as how managers could effectively create and design networks comprising various 
forms of partnerships (Hagedoorn et al., 2006). 
    In addition, there are a number of options for further studies. In the current paper, 
the determinative factors for firm’s centrality–based network capability are only 
empirically tested in the pharmaceutical biotechnology sector. Further research can 
reveal whether the same determinants we found are also important elements for firm’s 
centrality–based partnering capability in other high technology sectors. Considering a 
broader set of factors that may influence a firm’s ability to position itself centrally and 
a larger size of sample firms will also further deepen our understanding of the complex 
mechanisms in inter–firm R&D networks.  
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Appendix: Tables 
 
Table 1: Normalized degree–based network descriptive statistics in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology during 1991–1998  
 
Year 
 
Mean 
Degree 
 
S.D. 
Degree 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Network 
centralization 
 
1991 1.21 0.66 0.93 5.56 4.43% 
1992 0.94 0.56 0.62 3.09 2.17% 
1993 0.83 0.60 0.51 4.62 3.82% 
1994 0.75 0.62 0.40 3.97 3.24% 
1995 0.65 0.58 0.31 4.01 3.38% 
1996 0.64 0.63 0.27 4.56 3.94% 
1997 0.60 0.67 0.22 5.22 4.63% 
1998 0.54 0.54 0.22 3.44 2.91% 
          Source: Recombinant Capital. 
 
Table 2: Normalized closeness–based network descriptive statistics in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology during 1991–1998  
 
Year 
 
Mean 
Closeness 
 
S. D. 
Closeness 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
1991 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 
1992 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06 
1993 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.11 
1994 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.17 
1995 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.25 
1996 0.15 0.07 0.01 0.27 
1997 0.18 0.07 0 0.31 
1998 0.15 0.07 0 0.27 
                    Source: Recombinant Capital.  
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Table 3: Normalized betweenness–based network descriptive statistics in 
pharmaceutical biotechnology during 1991–1998  
 
Year 
 
Mean 
Betweenness 
 
S. D. 
Betweenness 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Network 
Centralization 
 
1991 0.02 0.06 0 0.43 0.42% 
1992 0.09 0.23 0 1.09 1.01% 
1993 0.24 0.70 0 4.51 4.30% 
1994 1.26 3.29 0 21.03 19.84% 
1995 1.15 2.61 0 25.44 24.37% 
1996 0.88 1.78 0 11.62 10.77% 
1997 0.67 1.49 0 11.07 10.42% 
1998 0.64 1.38 0 11.78 11.17% 
      Source: Recombinant Capital. 
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Table 4: The 40 most important players in pharmaceutical biotechnology in 1991–199813 
 
 
Company 
 
Sector 
 
Normalized 
Degree 
 
Normalized 
Closeness 
 
Normalized 
Betweenness 
 
1. Abgenix biotech 1.29 0.24 3.55 
2. Acacia Biosciences pharmaceutics  0.86 0.22 3.19 
3. Affymetrix biotech 3.44 0.25 7.81 
4. American Home Products pharmaceutics 1.72 0.23 2.90 
5. Amersham Pharmacia Biotech bio–pharmaceutics 1.72 0.24 3.52 
6. Bayer pharmaceutics 2.80 0.26 7.38 
7. Bristol–Myers Squibb pharmaceutics 3.01 0.23 5.41 
8. Centocor pharmaceutics 1.29 0.24 3.14 
9. Chiron biotech 1.72 0.23 3.02 
10. Corixa bio–pharmaceutics 1.51 0.22 1.37 
11. Du Pont pharmaceutics 1.08 0.21 2.97 
12. Elan biotech 2.15 0.23 3.73 
13. Eli Lily pharmaceutics 2.80 0.24 5.21 
14. Gene Logic biotech 1.29 0.23 2.59 
15. Genentech biotech 1.51 0.22 2.95 
16. Genetics Institute biotech 1.08 0.23 2.03 
17. Genome Therapeutics biotech 1.94 0.24 5.06 
18. Genzyme biotech 1.72 0.23 3.33 
19. Genzyme Transgenics biotech 1.08 0.21 2.24 
20. Hoechst Marion Roussel pharmaceutics 1.72 0.23 4.11 
21. Immunex biotech 1.08 0.22 2.02 
22. Incyte Pharmaceuticals pharmaceutics 2.58 0.27 8.84 
23. Lexicon Genetics pharmaceutics 0.86 0.22 1.20 
24. Medlmmune pharmaceutics 1.08 0.22 2.25 
25. Merck pharmaceutics 1.51 0.23 3.40 
26. Millennium Pharmaceuticals bio–pharmaceutics 1.51 0.22 3.06 
27. Novartis pharmaceutics 2.37 0.24 5.99 
28. Novo Nordisk pharmaceutics 2.15 0.24 3.66 
29. OncorMed biotech 1.29 0.24 4.03 
30. Oxford Asymmetry pharmaceutics 1.94 0.23 3.25 
31. Oxford GlycoSciences biotech 1.29 0.22 1.44 
32. Pasteur Merieux Connaught biotech 1.51 0.21 2.67 
33. Peptide Therapeutics biotech 1.08 0.22 2.31 
34. Pfizer pharmaceutics 3.44 0.25 6.59 
35.  Pharmacia & Upjohn pharmaceutics 1.94 0.23 4.94 
36. Roche bio–pharmaceutics 2.37 0.23 4.94 
37. Schering Plough pharmaceutics 3.44 0.28 11.78 
38. SmithKline Beecham pharmaceutics 3.44 0.25 8.76 
39. Tripos pharmaceutics 1.51 0.22 2.81 
40. Zeneca pharmaceutics 1.72 0.24 3.44 
Source: Recombinant Capital. 
                                                 
13 The names of companies are listed alphabetically.  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 Variable Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Centrality–based partnering capability 0.8859 0.9287 –       
2. Efficiency level 0.8948 0.2710 0.2989 –      
3. Dependency  0.0824 0.2625 –0.2694 0.1130 –     
4. Partnering experiences  1.5546 1.1145 0.8449 0.4154 –0.3194 –    
5. Duration 3.9000 2.0778 0.4864 0.5203 –0.1641 0.5855 –   
6. Time effect (1996) 0.2500 0.4344 –0.0109 –0.0639 0.1578 –0.0695 –0.0767 –  
7. Time effect (1997) 0.2500 0.4344 –0.1434 0.1223 –0.1020 0.0733 0.0906 –0.3333 – 
8. Time effect (1998) 0.2500 0.4344 0.2419 0.1525 –0.1553 0.1504 0.2439 –0.3333 –0.3333 
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Table 6: Panel instrumental variable estimates 
 2SLS 2SLS with Robust Standard 
Errors 
Optimal GMM 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Efficiency level 2.3103* 
(1.2421) 
2.2569* 
(1.2140) 
2.3103* 
(1.2140) 
2.2569* 
(1.2306) 
1.9365* 
(1.0886) 
1.7569 
(1.1431) 
2.2706* 
(1.2725) 
Dependency  -0.7216* 
(0.4340) 
-0.6955* 
(0.4062) 
-0.7216* 
(0.3923) 
-0.6955* 
(0.3604) 
-0.6523* 
(0.3742) 
-0.5733* 
(0.3473) 
-0.7171** 
(0.3612) 
Partnering experiences  0.5650*** 
(0.1017) 
0.5690*** 
(0.0990) 
0.5650*** 
(0.0953) 
0.5690*** 
(0.0937) 
0.5908*** 
(0.0906) 
0.6068*** 
(0.0900) 
0.5707*** 
(0.0921) 
Duration -0.1171* 
(0.0693) 
-0.1179 
(0.0720) 
-0.1171* 
(0.0598) 
-0.1179* 
(0.0648) 
-0.1106* 
(0.0567) 
-0.1043* 
(0.0618) 
-0.1302** 
(0.0647) 
Time effect(1996) -0.0328 
(0.1598) 
 -0.0328 
(0.1951) 
 -0.0443 
(0.1912) 
  
Time effect(1997) -0.6165*** 
(0.1997) 
-0.5776*** 
(0.1462) 
-0.6165*** 
(0.2101) 
-0.5776*** 
(0.1335) 
-0.6684*** 
(0.1923) 
-0.6077*** 
(0.1239) 
-0.6213*** 
(0.1311) 
Time effect(1998) -0.0681 
(0.1934) 
 -0.0681 
(0.1893) 
 -0.0778 
(0.1834) 
  
Constant -1.3639** 
(0.6794) 
-1.3564** 
(0.6838) 
-1.3639* 
(0.7087) 
-1.3564* 
(0.7445) 
-1.0650* 
(0.6103) 
-1.0156 
(0.6674) 
-1.3077* 
(0.7756) 
Instrument:        
Clustering coefficient √ √ √ √ √ √  
Biotechnology √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
US √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Germany √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Denmark √ √ √ √ √ √  
Firm age √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
        
p-val in overidentification test 0.5442 0.5241 0.1858 0.1774 0.1858 0.1774 0.2569 
p-val in endogeneity test 0.0015 0.0020 0.0020 0.0029 0.0020 0.0029 0.0021 
        
Number of observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
Centered R-squared 0.4266 0.4402 0.4266 0.4402 0.5166 0.5566 0.4355 
Uncentered R-squared 0.7007 0.7078 0.7007 0.7078 0.7477 0.7685 0.7053 
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; significance–levels * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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